The Scientific Foundations of Grounded Investigative Psychotherapy
This page explains how Grounded Investigative Psychotherapy, or GIP, differs from conventional therapeutic approaches and why Grounded Psychology, or GP, provides the foundation of my therapeutic work.
As a practitioner, I am interested in practical results and in maximising these. As a scientist, I am concerned with truth: with understanding human psychology as it is, and not merely as we imagine it to be. For this reason, the therapeutic and scientific dimensions of my work are inseparable. Reliable therapeutic work requires a reliable understanding of human beings.
The central problem addressed by GIP is one of the most pressing in psychotherapy: how can the therapist take an active part in understanding the client’s psychological life without imposing distorted or biased interpretations?
Most psychotherapeutic approaches respond to this difficulty by moving in one of two directions. Some preserve interpretation, but do not make the systematic reduction of interpretive bias a central methodological task. Others limit interpretation, but in doing so also limit the therapist’s active participation in the development of a detailed understanding of the client’s psychological life.
GIP is my response to this impasse. It preserves the therapist’s active role in the investigation of the client’s psychological life, but does so by making the reduction of interpretive bias a central methodological requirement. The aim is to develop a form of therapeutic inquiry that remains closely faithful both to the client’s lived experience and to the psychological structures and processes that organise it.
In brief
Grounded Psychology is the methodological and theoretical foundation of GIP.
Grounded Investigative Psychotherapy is the clinical application of Grounded Psychology.
An overview of Grounded Psychology
Grounded Psychology is my approach to the study and understanding of human experience. It is grounded because it starts with the careful observation and description of the facts of human life as they are lived, observed, reported, and expressed, rather than with abstract theory, over-intellectualisation, disciplinary convention, or inherited and sociocentric categories.
Its aim is to produce descriptions of human experience that are as complete, accurate, concrete, relevant, and as little distorted by bias as possible. For this reason, GP gives central importance to rich description, empirical grounding, and the careful use of language. This work does not stop at the description of isolated experiences. It also seeks to identify the recurrent patterns, processes, and structures through which human life becomes intelligible.
GP proceeds through what I call inclusive investigation: the attempt to understand human reality without excluding any relevant dimension of experience in advance. This does not mean beginning from a holistic worldview or assuming, from the outset, that human reality forms a single whole. It means that inquiry must remain open to all the dimensions through which human experience may be organised: physical, personal, social-cultural, developmental, historical, civilisational, and existential.
This openness is not eclecticism. It is governed by a strict empirical requirement: whatever is considered must remain answerable to experience and contribute to a more accurate understanding of the whole field of human reality and of the relations that organise it. The holistic character of the framework developed in GP is therefore not a starting premise, but the outcome of inclusive investigation.
Human experience does not organise itself according to disciplinary boundaries. For this reason, GP does not take those boundaries as a guide to inquiry. In this precise methodological sense, GP is undisciplined: it studies human phenomena according to their place within the whole of human reality, rather than according to their traditional allocation to psychology, psychotherapy, philosophy, history, literature, anthropology, or the social sciences. First-person reports, observed conduct, relationships, language, narratives, practices, institutions, cultural forms, texts, images, historical events, and everyday situations are therefore not treated as material belonging to separate disciplines. They are treated as human material, to be understood in relation to the structures that organise human life from within.
One of the results of this work is the identification of three fundamental structures of human life: the physical, the social-cultural, and the personal. These are not separate compartments, but interrelated structures through which human experience, personality, development, difficulty, and change become intelligible.
Grounded Investigative Psychotherapy is the clinical application of Grounded Psychology. In therapy, the principles of GP inform the way the client’s life, difficulties, relationships, conflicts, and developmental possibilities are explored. They are introduced carefully and progressively, through a collaborative process aimed at developing a more accurate and therapeutically useful understanding of the client’s experience. How this works in practice is presented in more detail on the page “GIP”.
A Different Standard for Mental Health and Personal Development
When seeking a therapist, the choice is often presented in terms of different theoretical orientations — person-centred, psychodynamic, cognitive-behavioural, existential, transpersonal, gestalt, and so on.
While this is standard practice within the profession, it raises important difficulties.
From a client’s perspective, it introduces an additional layer of complexity. Beyond choosing a qualified and suitable practitioner, one is expected to select a theoretical orientation, often without the necessary knowledge to do so. More fundamentally, these distinctions do not address the more important question: what mode of engagement does the therapist adopt in relation to the psychological life of the client?
This question brings two distinctions into view.
The first concerns the therapist’s posture in relation to the client: whether they take an active part in the exploration of the client’s psychological life, or remain essentially receptive and passive.
The second concerns the way investigative work is conducted when the therapist does take an active part in it. One possibility is that the therapist relies mainly on theories they have learned and then apply to the client’s material. When this happens, theory can easily function as doctrine, especially when it remains affected by sources of bias that are widespread, normalised, and insufficiently examined within psychotherapy and the human sciences. The other possibility is that investigative work proceeds through direct engagement with psychological phenomena, supported by grounded theory.
The issue is not the use of theory itself. Theory is essential to investigative work. The issue lies in the way it is produced and used.
My aim is to ensure that my clients’ needs for understanding, clarification, and sense-making are met in ways that remain closely connected to the realities of their psychological life.
For this reason, my therapeutic work takes the form of a grounded investigation into the client’s psychological reality. It is based on direct inquiry and supported by a theoretical framework developed through radical empirical research designed to minimise bias.
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The benefit for you is not simply to be understood, but to be supported in developing a deep, reliable, and transformative understanding of yourself and others.
From a client’s perspective, this matters a great deal. The question is not only whether a therapist is caring, qualified, or experienced, but whether their work is guided by a sufficiently accurate understanding of what human beings are, how psychological life is organised, and what processes are involved in difficulty, development, healing, and change.
The following sections develop these distinctions and clarify my position within the field of psychotherapy.
Psychotherapy and the disorder of the human sciences
Psychotherapy is part of the human sciences. The human sciences have sometimes been described by psychologists, social scientists, and philosophers of science as immature or pre-scientific fields. This concern has been voiced from within both psychology and the social sciences, and is clearly reflected in the persistent theoretical instability of these fields. It has not, however, received a satisfactory solution. Nor has it often been made the starting point for a systematic reconstruction of psychological knowledge, understood here in the broad sense of a general science of human beings.
The evidence for this is easy to identify. From their inception, these disciplines have been characterised by persistent fragmentation, competing schools of thought, and deep disagreement about basic questions. Widely diverging views compete to account for almost every aspect of human life, as well as for the more fundamental question of what a human being is.
This includes the very phenomena that bring people to therapy. There is no real agreement on many of the central realities with which psychotherapy deals: anxiety, depression, trauma, personality, development, suffering, change, and the relation between personal life and social existence. Even when the same words are used, they may be understood through very different and sometimes incompatible frameworks.
The same applies to psychotherapy, where this theoretical chaos has been normalised. This is why psychotherapists usually introduce themselves, not in generic terms, but according to a particular theoretical orientation, as is common throughout the human sciences. The now fashionable notion of the “integrative therapist”, which aims to draw on approaches whose principles, assumptions, and ways of working are in many cases mutually incompatible, only highlights the awkwardness of the situation.
This diversity is often presented in a positive light, as though it were a sign of intellectual vitality, creativity, or productive openness. It can also be made to appear reassuring to the public: more schools, theories, techniques, and concepts may seem to mean more resources for those seeking therapy. But this impression is misleading. A diversity of techniques can indeed be valuable, provided they are used appropriately and remain grounded in the client’s experience. The same cannot be said of theoretical and conceptual disorder. When radically different theories give incompatible accounts of the same phenomena, this is not simply a sign of richness or wider coverage. It is also a sign that the field lacks a sufficiently stable and coherent understanding of its own object.
In this respect, less can be more. A smaller number of clearer, better-grounded, and more accurate concepts is preferable to an expanding accumulation of theories whose assumptions conflict with one another. The problem is not that psychotherapy has too few conceptual resources, but that many of these resources are insufficiently grounded, insufficiently examined, and insufficiently integrated. What is needed is not more theoretical proliferation, but a more reliable foundation for understanding human beings and their difficulties.
My work began from dissatisfaction with this state of affairs. I did not want my understanding of human beings and their psychology to be inherited from one more school of thought within an already fragmented field. I wanted it to emerge from a diagnosis of what is going wrong in psychotherapy and the human sciences, and from the development of a workable solution.
Sociocentrism and over-intellectualisation
Social anthropology has provided some of the clearest resources for diagnosing this problem. It has shown that sociocentrism affects scientific representations just as much as everyday ones. In other words, the ways in which human scientists conceptualise and map human realities are often shaped by the surrounding culture and its ideologies.
When psychological theories are considered in their historical and cultural context, many of them appear not as purely neutral descriptions, but as representations partly shaped by the societies in which they are produced. They reflect, often implicitly, the assumptions, values, anxieties, priorities, and self-understandings of those societies.
In the Western context, this problem is intensified by a strong tendency toward over-intellectualisation.
This leads to the privileging of abstract rhetoric, conceptual construction, and formal logic over the neutral and rigorous treatment of empirical material.
Little has been done within the human sciences to overcome these sociocentric and over-intellectualising biases.
One of the main reasons for this inertia is the relative weakness of practical pressures from outside the disciplines themselves. The human sciences differ from the natural sciences in this respect, because they are not directly answerable to concrete fields such as infrastructure, technology, nutrition, or medicine, where contact with reality quickly exposes theoretical inadequacy.
Psychological realities are not entirely without practical force. This has been felt more particularly in two domains: social anthropology and psychotherapy. In social anthropology, the comparative nature of the discipline — which places Western anthropologists in contact with the social and cultural realities of other civilisations — has led researchers, at least in part, to acknowledge the impact of sociocentrism on their descriptions and theories. These advances have remained limited, however. Because over-intellectualisation itself has not been properly addressed, sociocentrism has not been adequately resolved either. The case of psychotherapy is more complex.
Psychotherapy’s paradoxical solution
The history of the field shows that change has occurred under the pressure of various factors. These include the persistence and growth of mental health difficulties, the increasing demand for personal development, and the limited effectiveness of earlier dominant models, especially psychoanalysis. Until the 1940s, psychotherapy was dominated by psychoanalysis in clinical settings and behaviourism in academic psychology.
In different ways, both approaches remained distant from the close qualitative study of lived experience.
Psychoanalysis did pay close attention to clinical material, but it often transformed this material through speculative interpretation, treating particular narratives, symptoms, dreams, and associations as signs of hidden theoretical mechanisms.
Its concepts could then become so elastic that almost any material might be interpreted through them, rather than being allowed to correct or unsettle the theory itself.
Behaviourism, by contrast, treated scientific seriousness as if it required the exclusion of inner experience from inquiry and the reduction of psychological life to observable behaviour and experimentally defined learning processes. What was largely missing was a form of therapeutic theory grounded in the detailed study of experience as it is lived, described, and encountered in therapy.
It was against this background that the humanistic tradition of psychotherapy, and within it Carl Rogers’ person-centred counselling, developed. Its aim was to move psychotherapy closer to people’s lived experience, and away from the speculative over-intellectualisation of psychoanalysis and the reduction of psychological life to observable behaviour in behaviourism. One of Rogers’ main intentions was to neutralise therapist interpretative bias by promoting client self-direction. His central idea was that the therapeutic process could proceed without the direct application of an interpretive framework. In this model, the process would rest not on explanation or diagnosis imposed from outside, but on the therapist’s positive presence and attitude, and on their capacity for active listening.
This was a major contribution.
It helped psychotherapy move away from forms of interpretation that were often too theoretical, intrusive, or disconnected from the client’s lived experience.
It also gave unprecedented importance to the client’s own voice, to the subjective meaning of their experience, and to the quality of the therapeutic relationship itself. In doing so, person-centred counselling helped humanise psychotherapy.
It made space for forms of healing that arise when a person is listened to seriously, received without judgement, and met with acceptance, empathy, and congruence. For many clients, this has represented not a minor technical adjustment, but a deeply significant therapeutic experience: the experience of being allowed to speak, to feel, to unfold, and to be encountered as a person rather than interpreted as a case.
Rogers’ own work did not remain limited to this early formulation. Later in his career, his reflections moved more explicitly toward questions of human nature, psychological development, and the cultural assumptions shaping psychological theory. In this respect, his work began to point beyond a merely non-directive method and toward a broader and deeper understanding of human beings. His conception of the person also changed in profound ways. These later developments were not fully absorbed by the mainstream person-centred tradition, partly because his earlier views had already hardened into accepted assumptions.
What was largely retained, therefore, was the methodological core of the early person-centred approach: the restriction of therapist interpretation and the privileging of client self-direction. The more radical implications of Rogers’ later work were, in this sense, largely lost to the mainstream.
This retained solution to over-intellectualisation presents a major flaw. It rests on two main premises:
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the client is the only reliable expert of their psychological life
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when provided with favourable conditions for self-exploration, the client will eventually find their way and resolve their issues independently
Carl Rogers (1902-1987)
The result is that the entire responsibility for the investigative aspect of the therapeutic process is transferred to the client. In this sense, the progress achieved by psychotherapy came at a cost. Person-centred counselling rightly sought to protect the client from intrusive interpretation, therapist authority, and the imposition of abstract theory. It also introduced a more humane, respectful, and relational understanding of therapy than had often been available before. Yet the solution it offered did not fully resolve the epistemological problem that had made therapist interpretation unreliable in the first place. Instead of reconstructing the conditions under which interpretation could become more grounded, less biased, and more faithful to the client’s experience, much of the field moved toward restricting interpretation altogether.
This restriction can be protective, and in many situations it is therapeutically valuable. But it can also frustrate the needs of clients who seek not only acceptance and emotional support, but active help in developing clearer awareness, deeper understanding, and a more accurate account of their psychological life.
Later developments within the humanistic tradition, such as Eugene Gendlin’s experiential and focusing-oriented work, continued this effort to move away from over-intellectualisation by returning attention to felt experience. They did not, however, resolve the more fundamental issue at stake here: how the therapist may retain an active interpretive role without introducing distortion.
In practice, expecting the client to lead the investigative process adequately and successfully on their own often proves unrealistic. Person-centred methods do produce important results. These results, however, do not always meet the full range of clients’ needs and expectations. Most people struggle to make full, deep, and accurate sense of their experiences when left to their own devices. What many of them expect is that the therapist should function as a resource enabling a significant expansion of psychological knowledge, awareness, and understanding, in the hope that this will in turn allow meaningful changes in their lives. In other words, they expect the therapist not merely to support the investigative process, but to take part in it.
There is also another problem. When therapists lack a deep and well-grounded understanding of human psychology, non-interpretive or minimally interpretive methods can allow this limitation to remain hidden. Bias may then continue to operate, but in more discreet and less explicit forms.
My response to the problem: radical empiricism
Since Rogers’ redefinition of the therapist’s posture, psychotherapy has not, to my knowledge, produced a convincing solution that resolves the problem of interpretive bias while preserving an active interpretive role for the therapist. My work is an attempt to fill this gap.
As a therapist, I want to be able to contribute actively to the investigative process without introducing distortion and bias. I want to remain as close as possible to my clients’ experiences and psychological realities, without imposing extraneous theories, meanings, or concerns on what they bring.
To achieve this, I have addressed the problem at its source. I have worked to identify and resolve the main epistemological issues that keep the human sciences in a state of immaturity, and to produce a theoretical framework with a strong empirical foundation. In this sense, facts precede theory. Theory is developed in response to what is observed and remains open to ongoing revision.
Through years of empirical research, clinical experience, and personal development, I have worked to move beyond the limitations of existing psychological and psychotherapeutic theories and to develop a more grounded, less sociocentric, and more workable understanding of human psychology.
To carry out this work, I have embraced a form of radical empiricism based on a number of methodological principles and personal conditions of inquiry. The most central are presented below.
Grounded theorisation
Grounded theorisation concerns the production of theory through sustained contact with empirical reality. Every theoretical statement is grounded in verifiable naturalistic facts, including those that identify relations, patterns, or structures. Theory does not proceed from modelling, laboratory constructions, statistical abstractions, or speculative reasoning.
More generally, my work avoids forms of intellectualisation that distance inquiry from reality. This includes abstract analysis, speculative reasoning, and the use of socially inherited representations as sources of authority. The guiding principle is that theory must emerge from careful attention to phenomena themselves, rather than from conceptual constructions shaped by culture or prior assumptions.
The empirical identification of psychological structures
A central part of my scientific work has consisted in identifying psychological structures from naturalistic human material. By psychological structures, I do not mean theoretical entities borrowed from established schools of thought within psychology or the social sciences. I mean recurrent phenomena, processes, and organisations of human experience reconstructed from empirically accessible material: first-person reports, observed conduct, activities, verbal expressions, narratives, interactions, practices, objects, texts, images, institutional rules, roles, procedures, settings, spatial arrangements, and recorded events.
This method is empirical in a radical sense. It does not begin with experimental constructions, statistical abstractions, disciplinary models, or inherited conceptual grids. It begins with facts as they present themselves in ordinary human life: personal experience, interpersonal situations, bodily expressions, language, cultural forms, social arrangements, historical materials, civilisational patterns, and the observable organisation of everyday existence. The aim is to identify, across these materials, the structures that organise human life from within.
For example, in the study of a person’s relation to their child, one may identify an oscillation between two modes of being: a role-based mode, organised around the representation of being a good mother, and a self-based mode, in which spontaneity and personal immediacy become more available. In a non-clinical context, such an observation is not treated primarily as a therapeutic formulation. It becomes one empirical instance of a more general psychological question: how human beings are organised through the relation between social role and personal existence.
This operation may be described as empirical-phenomenological structural analysis. It is empirical because it remains answerable to concrete naturalistic facts. It is phenomenological because it attends to the way human realities are lived, embodied, expressed, and organised from the standpoint of human existence itself. It is structural because it does not stop at isolated observations, but seeks to identify recurrent organisations that make individual and collective phenomena intelligible. This method has allowed my research to move from concrete human material toward a general psychology without passing through the inherited theoretical divisions of the human sciences.
To apply this principle fully, one must be able to keep existing theories at a sufficient distance and resist treating them as authorities or guiding frameworks. Their value can only be properly assessed once one has developed one’s own grounded relation to the material and can relate the work of others to one’s own theorisation.
Inclusive investigation
Inclusive investigation concerns the scope of inquiry. It is based on the principle that all relevant human phenomena should come under study, without selection bias resulting from disciplinary boundaries, thematic preferences, or other prior exclusions. It brings the physical, personal, and civilisational aspects of human life together within a shared field of inquiry. It does not assume in advance that one dimension is primary, or that all dimensions must be explained through a single prior principle.
This openness is not eclecticism. It is governed by a strict empirical requirement: whatever is considered must remain answerable to experience and contribute to a more accurate understanding of the whole field of human reality and of the relations that organise it.
Nor is inclusive investigation holism as a starting doctrine. It does not begin by asserting that human reality is a whole, or that all phenomena must be interpreted through a pre-existing holistic model. It begins from a methodological refusal: no relevant dimension of human experience should be excluded, separated, reduced, or assigned in advance to a particular academic or professional domain.
The holistic character of the framework developed in GP is therefore not a starting premise. It is the outcome of inclusive investigation. It emerged from the finding that human experience cannot be adequately understood when the physical, social-cultural, and personal dimensions are treated as separate domains, reduced to one another, or assigned in advance to different academic or professional domains and studied without regard to the relations that organise them. Holism therefore appears at the level of the findings, not at the level of initial methodological assumption.
Both aspects of my work — the methodological requirement that no relevant phenomenon be excluded in advance, and the resulting holistic framework — stand against a recurrent tendency in Western thought to isolate and atomise human reality. At the methodological level, inclusive investigation resists the premature exclusion or separation of relevant phenomena. At the theoretical level, the holistic framework that results from this investigation resists the treatment of the physical, social-cultural, and personal dimensions as separate domains that can be understood independently of one another. In both cases, the aim is to avoid partial and distorted representations of human experience, and to replace intellectualised abstraction with a more direct empirical articulation of the relations that organise human life.
Inclusive investigation therefore does not mean simply widening the field of inquiry. It does not consist in adding more topics, disciplines, or types of material to an otherwise unchanged method. It means refusing to divide human reality in advance into separate domains, and seeking instead to identify the relations through which its different aspects are actually organised. In this sense, it is both anti-exclusionary and anti-reductionist: anti-exclusionary because no relevant phenomenon is ruled out beforehand, and anti-reductionist because no dimension is treated in advance as the sole explanation of the others.
Beyond providing a global and articulated picture of human psychology, inclusive investigation also makes it possible to identify its fundamental structures and to reveal how the physical, personal, and civilisational aspects of human life are organised and related to one another.
An undisciplined approach to inquiry
This principle concerns the status of disciplinary boundaries within inquiry. Disciplinary boundaries separating psychological, societal, and historical sciences are, in my view, largely products of Western ideology and institutional organisation. They do not correspond to the structure of the phenomena themselves and should therefore not govern inquiry.
An undisciplined approach to inquiry means that human phenomena are not studied according to their traditional allocation to established scientific disciplines, but according to their place within a single field of reality. The advantage of this approach is twofold. First, it requires all human phenomena to be understood within one coherent picture, rather than broken down into separate fragments that may never be properly reconnected. Second, it allows the use of different ad hoc methods where these are appropriate to particular phenomena, while subordinating them to a single global methodological framework.
A commitment to deep personal development
Within psychotherapy, inquiry cannot remain purely intellectual, external, or objectifying. It cannot focus only on others, or only on the social-cultural dimension of human psychology. It must also be personal, experiential, and reflexive, and therefore involve direct engagement with oneself.
However, ordinary experience is not enough. Some of the most fundamental structures of human psychology — particularly the physical aspect and what I call the personal aspect, namely the part of personality that is not reducible to socialisation — do not become fully accessible through ordinary experience. They are revealed more plainly in certain transformative or peak experiences, in which these structures become more directly accessible and must then be worked through.
Deep personal development is not separate from inquiry. It is one of its conditions and, to some extent, one of its methods. In this sense, inquiry in psychotherapy is both informative and transformative. The aim is to produce knowledge which, at the same time, deepens understanding and refines the very instrument through which that knowledge is generated — namely, the therapist themselves.
The study of Western civilisation
A deep understanding of Western civilisation, particularly of its specificities in relation to other human civilisations, has two major benefits. Firstly, it helps free the study of human psychology from sociocentric bias. It makes it possible to identify, isolate, and neutralise ideological components that would otherwise constrain our representations of human psychology.
Secondly, it facilitates the accurate understanding of clients’ psychology, since their psychological structure is shaped to a significant extent by the Western civilisational world in which they live. This, in turn, increases the relevance and effectiveness of the therapeutic process. Although essential, this type of expertise is largely absent from psychotherapeutic training and remains seriously underestimated in university-based psychological studies.
From academia to psychotherapy
Taken together, these principles led me to a methodological position that the institutionalised human sciences could not accommodate. The break involved was not merely intellectual. It concerned the conditions under which inquiry is allowed to proceed. To follow this path meant working outside the forms of thought, method, and institutional conformity that govern academic life. It also meant returning inquiry to the facts themselves, and through them to a more rigorous contact with reality.
In practice, the institutional resistance to this kind of inquiry was such that I could only continue the work independently. Leaving academia marked a turning point in my life. It was then that I decided to become a full-time psychotherapist and acquire the necessary qualifications to do so. This move further radicalised my epistemological stance and my commitment to radical empiricism.
The framework I developed
The result of these efforts has been a conceptual and interpretive framework firmly grounded in the realities of human psychology. The full results of this work will be disseminated through three successive publications in the near future. For the purposes of this website, I can only introduce a few elements of the framework.
Among these elements is the distinction between three fundamental structures that make up every human being:
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the physical, which includes both the organic and the energetic
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the social-cultural
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the personal, which is not reducible to socialisation
These three dimensions are central to my understanding of psychological life. They are not separate compartments of the human being, but interrelated structures whose relations help make human experience, personality, development, suffering, and change intelligible.
A brief presentation of these three aspects is provided on the page “Framework”. The framework also includes a detailed description of three developmental processes involving these structures. These distinctions and processes inform my work with clients, while being introduced in therapy only where they are relevant to the client’s experience.
What distinguishes my work from mainstream psychotherapy
Three major characteristics distinguish my work from the way mainstream psychotherapy usually proceeds.
Firstly, I have extensive experience in conducting grounded and bias-aware psychological investigations.
Secondly, because my theoretical framework is strongly empirically grounded, and because I conducted the empirical work on which it is based rather than receiving the framework from a third party, I do not relate to it as a doctrine. It remains a flexible and open structure.
Thirdly, the framework I use has been developed through sustained work on the principal biases affecting the human sciences and psychotherapy. As a result, when it is brought into therapy, the risk of distortion or betrayal of the client’s experience is reduced and more carefully controlled.
The contrast becomes clearer when one considers how psychotherapeutic theories are usually acquired and used in practice. Therapists are usually separated from the direct production of empirical psychological knowledge, not to mention the kind of research I have conducted. They are also generally unfamiliar with the process of conducting empirical investigations, including in the context of therapy.
The theories they use are usually acquired through study and only secondarily supported by experiential exercises, however valuable those may be. As a consequence, therapists often find themselves applying theories that are not only frequently biased, but that also tend to function as doctrinal frameworks. The process often moves from theory to facts, rather than from facts to theory.
In practice, my position allows therapeutic inquiry to remain closely grounded in the client’s experience while drawing, where relevant, on a framework designed to deepen and extend understanding. This is what I call Grounded Investigative Psychotherapy. Its application is presented on the page “GIP”.
A new reference for psychotherapy
It is difficult to imagine psychotherapy undergoing a deep reform that would reflect the way I work, since this would require a break from a deeply ingrained institutional and ideological status quo. It is therefore likely that psychotherapy will continue to be shaped by its current tensions and contradictions.
Nevertheless, I believe strongly in the capacity of my work to serve as a reference point that has so far been missing. It may inspire and influence individual therapists and human scientists who are free to draw on some of its aspects and incorporate them into their own work. Even this alone could contribute to a gradual transformation of psychotherapy.
What this means for you
If you become one of my clients, the purpose of the work is clear. By working with me, you will develop a genuine and operational awareness and understanding of yourself and others. This gives you a reliable and lasting foundation for the independent continuation of your personal development.
The key words here are:
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a more grounded and effective orientation toward yourself, others, and life
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greater authority over yourself and your life
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increased agency
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greater freedom
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lasting empowerment
It is important to emphasise that what is gained through this work is far from being the result of a purely intellectual exercise. Because the work remains closely connected to the reality of human experience, insight develops without becoming detached from the experiential world of feeling and intuition. On the contrary, it grows in contact with them. This is where mind and life meet, and where experience and understanding become one.